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Abstract—Location-based queries enable fundamental services for mobile road network travelers. While the benefits of location-based
services (LBS) are numerous, exposure of mobile travelers’ location information to untrusted LBS providers may lead to privacy
breaches. In this paper, we propose STARCLOAK, a utility-aware and attack-resilient approach to building a privacy-preserving query
system for mobile users traveling on road networks. STARCLOAK has several desirable properties. First, STARCLOAK supports
user-defined k-user anonymity and l-segment indistinguishability, along with user-specified spatial and temporal utility constraints, for
utility-aware and personalized location privacy. Second, unlike conventional solutions which are indifferent to underlying road network
structure, STARCLOAK uses the concept of stars and proposes cloaking graphs for effective location cloaking on road networks. Third,
STARCLOAK achieves strong attack-resilience against replay and query injection-based attacks through randomized star selection and
pruning. Finally, to enable scalable query processing with high throughput, STARCLOAK makes cost-aware star selection decisions by
considering query evaluation and network communication costs. We evaluate STARCLOAK on two real-world road network datasets
under various privacy and utility constraints. Results show that STARCLOAK achieves improved query success rate and throughput,
reduced anonymization time and network usage, and higher attack-resilience in comparison to XSTAR, its most relevant competitor.
Index Terms—Privacy, location privacy, location-based services, road networks, mobile query services
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1 INTRODUCTION
T HE growth of location-based services (LBSs) is fueled byubiquitous wireless connectivity, universal presence of smart
mobile devices with multi-modal sensing capability, and increased
investments from industry and government on the Internet of
Things. Juniper Research [1] forecasted the LBS market to reach
$43.3 billion in revenue in 2019, rising from an estimated $12.2
billion in 2014. [2] reports that 74% of adult smartphone owners
use their phones to get direction or information based on their cur-
rent location. As more and more mobile travelers and vehicles are
connected continuously and automatically, they are embraced by
life-enriching location-based experiences and services, including
but not limited to improved emergency assistance, real-time traffic
alerts, and location recommendations.
While there is ongoing research in answering queries and
providing services for mobile users traveling on road networks [3],
[4], [5], [6], users’ location privacy poses an important concern.
Unauthorized location exposure may cause vulnerability for abuse
such as unwanted advertisement, stalking, and location spoofing.
In addition, when private location data of a mobile user is linked to
sensitive public locations such as health clinics, cancer treatment
centers, nightclubs or religious organizations, such unauthorized
linkage may cause ethical, professional, and social risks both
to individuals and the society at large. As a result, it becomes
imperative to protect road network travelers’ location privacy as
they interact with third-party LBS providers via service queries.
One viable approach to protecting location privacy of road
network travelers is location anonymization through obfuscating
or cloaking the mobile user’s actual location. A practical anony-
mization framework should consider multiple aspects. First, the
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road network structure must be taken into account during anony-
mization, both for effective privacy protection and efficient query
processing with anonymized locations. Second, the framework
should support user-defined, personalized privacy goals such as k-
user anonymity and l-segment distinguishability. Third, anonymi-
zation should incur as little utility loss as possible; in particular, if
there are any utility constraints such as maximum spatial cloaking
region size or maximum tolerable time delay in query response,
the anonymization framework should satisfy these constraints.
These enable the anonymization framework to be flexible in
serving users with different privacy and utility needs. Fourth,
the anonymization framework should be resilient to replay or
query injection-based inference attacks. A sophisticated adversary
who observes a cloaked region should not be able to infer the
user’s true location. Finally, the anonymization framework should
have low communication and IO cost, i.e., anonymized cloaked
locations should be compact enough to be sent through a wireless
network without much network overhead, and they should be
usable without increased processing effort.
To meet these goals, we propose and develop STARCLOAK, a
utility-aware and attack-resilient approach to building a privacy-
preserving location query system for mobile users traveling on
road networks. STARCLOAK relies on optimized data structures
and algorithms for effectively and efficiently determining cloaked
regions for incoming queries, such as the star, star graph, and
cloaking graph data structures. STARCLOAK maintains its internal
data structures as new queries are processed, and generates can-
didate star-sets as cloaked regions when it identifies that certain
users’ queries can be successfully served. STARCLOAK’s candi-
date star-set pruner, which is implemented with high parallelism,
enables pruning of candidate star-sets to generate low-cost cloaked
subgraphs with improved attack-resilience via randomized prun-
ing. In addition, we also propose two variants of STARCLOAK,
namely spatially bounded STARCLOAK and hybrid STARCLOAK,
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2for generating more compact cloaked regions with negligible
sacrifice in query success rate and throughput.
We evaluate STARCLOAK and its variants through extensive
experiments on real-world Georgia and California road networks
of different scales, under varying privacy and utility constraints.
We also compare STARCLOAK with two baseline anonymization
approaches (random sampling and network expansion) as well
as XSTAR [7], which is the most relevant work to ours from
the literature. Results show that STARCLOAK offers significantly
improved query success rate and throughput. Furthermore, com-
pared to XSTAR, STARCLOAK achieves substantially reduced
anonymization time, network bandwidth usage, and improved
resilience to inference attacks.
2 STARCLOAK OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTS
STARCLOAK can be viewed as a trusted location anonymization
service. It forms a middle layer between mobile users and their
untrusted LBS providers. Assume that user Alice issues a service
query while she is moving on a road segment. Without STAR-
CLOAK, Alice’s device directly sends her query with her true
current location to an untrusted LBS provider, which executes the
query based on Alice’s location and sends the results to Alice’s
device. However, if Alice is using STARCLOAK, STARCLOAK
will first compute an anonymized location for Alice and replace
her true location with the anonymized location transparently from
Alice, before the query is sent to the untrusted LBS provider.
Figure 1 illustrates the reference architecture. Let q denote
the original query of mobile user u. When u issues query q with
their true location, the location and query are intercepted by the
location anonymization engine. The engine transforms u’s true
location to a cloaked location S while meeting the personalized
privacy and utility profile of u. Next, the engine relays the
anonymized location and query to the LBS provider. The LBS
provider computes a candidate result, and the candidate result is
received by the location anonymization engine. Since the cloaked
location often has lower resolution than the actual location to meet
privacy goals, the candidate result received by the anonymization
engine may contain false positives. The anonymization engine
performs post-processing of results to filter false positives. Finally,
the anonymization engine delivers the exact query answer to u.
This section presents an overview of STARCLOAK and de-
scribes its privacy, utility, attack, and cost models. STARCLOAK
assumes that mobile users travel on spatially constrained road
networks or walk paths. Thus, we first introduce the basic models
for road networks, location privacy, inference attacks, and query
costs, followed by our problem statement combining these models.
2.1 Road Network Model
We represent a road network as an undirected graph G =
〈VG, EG〉 with the node set VG denoting road junctions and edge
set EG denoting road segments, respectively. Each road segment
connects a pair of junctions. Figure 2 illustrates a road network.
We use dG(v) to denote the degree of a node v with respect to G,
dG(v) = |{w|(v, w) ∈ EG}|. We call v an intersection node if
dG(v) ≥ 3. For example, in Figure 2, v5 is an intersection node.
An anonymized location in the road network can be repre-
sented as a subgraph. Border nodes are nodes that connect a
subgraph S to the remainder of the main graph G.
Definition 1 (Subgraph). S is a subgraph of road network G,
denoted by S = 〈VS , ES〉, if and only if VS ⊂ VG andES ⊂ EG.
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Fig. 1: Overall architecture of STARCLOAK
Definition 2 (Border Node). Let S denote a subgraph of G. The
set of border nodes of S, denoted BV (S), are nodes in both S
and G but have edges that are in EG but not in ES . Formally:
BV (S) = {v | ∃w ∈ (VG \ VS) s.t. (v, w) ∈ EG}
Equivalently, border nodes are those nodes v in S that satisfy
the condition: dG(v) > dS(v). As an example, we can construct
a subgraph S in Figure 2 as: VS = {v2, v4, v5, v6, v7, v10} and
ES = {(v4, v5), (v5, v10), (v5, v6), (v6, v7), (v2, v6)}. Then, it
holds that: BV (S) = {v2, v4, v7, v10}. A sequence of edges
(v0, v1), . . . , (vi, vi+1), . . . , (vL−1, vL), where all vi are unique
and satisfy the conditions dG(v0) ≥ 3, dG(vL) ≥ 3, and
dG(vi) = 2 for 0 < i < L, constitute a segment denoted by
v0vL.
2.2 Utility-Aware Location Privacy Model
STARCLOAK enforces location privacy for mobile travelers while
considering privacy and utility metrics simultaneously. It supports
personalized location k-user anonymity and l-segment indistin-
guishability, such that instead of using a system-supplied fixed k
or l for all users and queries [8], it achieves high versatility via
user-specified privacy needs and specifications [9]. In addition, we
introduce two utility metrics to capture location utility constraints:
maximum spatial and temporal cloaking resolutions. These utility
metrics constrain and regulate STARCLOAK so that it performs
anonymization while meeting the spatial and temporal tolerances.
STARCLOAK performs location anonymization via cloaking,
which is a process that transforms the user’s exact location into
a cloaked region with lower resolution to satisfy user-defined
privacy requirements. The goal is to choose the cloaked region
with as little utility loss and query costs as possible. We start by
formalizing the privacy notions: k-user anonymity and l-segment
indistinguishability. k-user anonymity protects user u’s location
by “hiding u in a crowd”, i.e., enforcing at least k− 1 other users
in the vicinity of u report the same cloaked location. We observe
that k-anonymity is not sufficient to prevent the linkage of user u
with a sensitive public location or road segment, since the cloaked
k-anonymized region may lack sufficient segment diversity, e.g.,
it may contain only a single road segment. This motivates the
proposal of l-segment indistinguishability.
Definition 3 (k-user anonymity). An anonymized location S
(subgraph of road network G) is said to satisfy k-user anonymity,
if at least k active users report S.
Definition 4 (l-segment indistinguishability). An anonymized
location S is said to satisfy l-segment indistinguishability, if it
contains at least l different road segments and any one segment
could be plausibly associated with a user reporting S.
3In STARCLOAK, a query q is allowed to specify a custom
privacy requirement as (δqk, δ
q
l ), such that δ
q
k ≥ 1 is the desired
k-user anonymity level and δql ≥ 1 is the desired l-segment
indistinguishability level.
A trivial approach to achieve maximum protection could be to
assign the whole road network G as the anonymized location.
However, this approach clearly provides weak utility and low
quality of service. Hence, we incorporate spatial and temporal
cloaking resolutions as utility constraints. The spatial constraint
σs bounds the spatial resolution of the anonymized location.
This is necessary so that anonymized locations are not arbitrarily
large. The temporal constraint σt bounds the maximum time delay
resulting from anonymization. This is necessary so that the query-
issuing user receives a response in timely manner.
Definition 5 (Query profile). For user u with query q, we denote
by (δqk, δ
q
l , σ
q
s , σ
q
t ) the complete service profile of q, where δ
q
k, δ
q
l
are the privacy parameters and σqs , σ
q
t are the utility parameters.
We expect STARCLOAK to operate in an environment with
diverse user and query profiles and diverse road conditions. It is
sometimes possible, e.g., due to low traffic density or few active
users in the system at night time, that desired δqk-anonymity level is
unachievable under strict σqs and σ
q
t constraints for some query q.
In such cases where q cannot be serviced, it is discarded (dropped).
2.3 Inference Attack Models
An adversary may run sophisticated inference attacks with the
goal of identifying probabilities of each segment s in anonymized
S to be the user’s actual segment. From an attack-resilience
perspective, the ideal case is when the association of the mobile
user with the segments in S follows a uniform distribution (with
equal probability 1/|S|). In order to formalize an adversary’s
association power, we use the notion of linkability [7].
Definition 6 (Linkability). For user u with anonymized location
S, the linkability of u with a specific segment s∗ ∈ S is the prob-
ability that adversary associates u with s∗ based on adversarial
background knowledge Kad, denoted as: link[u← s∗|S,Kad].
The background knowledge considered here includes knowl-
edge of the location anonymization algorithm, underlying road
network structure, and estimation of overall query cost (Sec. 2.4).
In a general replay attack, the adversary observes the anony-
mized location as set of segments S and attempts to perform
reverse-engineering with understanding of the anonymization al-
gorithm. Specifically, the adversary re-runs the anonymization
algorithm, denoted A(·), for each segment s ∈ S that could
potentially be the mobile user’s actual location. The similarity
between S and the algorithm’s output S′ generated by A, is used
to estimate the likelihood of s having generated S:
like[S|u← s,Kad] = |S
′ ∩ S|
|S| (1)
We propose that this can be improved in two ways to create a
correlation-based replay attack. First, the general replay attack
only takes into account the placement of a single user in S;
however, in utility-preserving k-anonymity algorithms, one user’s
location is cloaked together with other active users in the vicinity.
Then, the placement of the remaining k−1 users in S should also
play a role in the likelihood calculation. Note that there are a total
of
((
S
k−1
))
different possible placements of k − 1 queries in S.
We denote by mi each placement, such that 1 ≤ i ≤
((
S
k−1
))
.
v1
v2
v3 v8 v13
v7
v6
v4
v5
v9
v10
v11
v12
v16
v15
v14
q2
q1
Fig. 2: Road network and query injection example
Second, the adversary may have statistical knowledge of mobile
users’ distribution on the road network. For example, the adversary
may know the traffic density distribution of the city during rush
hour, which enables the adversary to predict that there is higher
probability that the user is actually located on a dense segment
rather than a sparse segment. We denote by Pr[s] and Pr[mi] the
probability of user u being located on segment s and remaining
k − 1 users being located as in the placement of mi according
to the background distribution knowledge. Combining the two
improvements, we compute likec[S|u← s,Kad] as:
likec[S|u← s,Kad] =
( Sk−1 )∑
i=1
Pr[s] · Pr[mi] · like[S|u← s,mi,Kad]
Then, linkability can be calculated as:
link[u← s∗|S,Kad] = like
c[S|u← s∗,Kad]∑
s∈S like
c[S|u← s,Kad] (2)
In replay attacks, the assumption is that the adversary is an
observer only. Next, we also consider active adversaries who can
inject queries into the system, i.e., execute a query injection at-
tack. We expect anonymization algorithms with strong minimality
(tightness) to be more vulnerable to the query injection attack.
Consider an anonymization algorithm which cloaks segments into
the same anonymized location if and only if they include at least
one active query and through the shortest paths between the active
queries. This knowledge can be exploited by an inference attack.
For example, consider the anonymized location S that consists of
the bold lines in Figure 2. Suppose that q1 and q2 are the queries
injected by the adversary with privacy profiles (δk, δl) = (3, 3).
Then, by the minimality property, the adversary can infer that
the third (actual) query was issued from either segment v4v5 or
segment v5v10. To capture the effects of query injection attack,
we slightly modify the likec calculation. We assign zero to the
likelihood value of placement mi if the segments corresponding
to this placement conflict with the injected queries’ locations.
2.4 Query Cost Model
An important challenge in finding an optimal anonymized location
S to a query q is to minimize the cost of the query when executed
with the anonymized location. We study two types of cost: cost of
query evaluation and cost of communication.
Cost of Anonymized Query Evaluation: Most query pro-
cessing approaches for road networks are based on two types of
fundamental operations: edge-based and node-based. The edge-
based operation takes a query q and an edge e as input and returns
a set of objects on e denoted Oe(q, e) which satisfy the query
condition. For segment s potentially composed of a sequence
of edges, we have: Os(q, s) = ∪e∈sOe(q, e). We denote by
Cs the average computation cost of evaluating the query on a
segment. While Cs depends on a variety of factors, in our current
system, we set Cs statically according to the underlying spatial
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Fig. 3: Illustration of query processing on a road network
index implementation (e.g., look-up table, R-Tree). The node-
based operation takes a query q and a node v as input and returns
a set of objects in the vicinity of v denotedOv(q, v) which satisfy
the query condition. The computation cost of evaluating a node-
based query is denoted by Cv .
Let q denote a query issued at some position while traveling
on segment s, and let vsb and v
s
e denote the two ends of s. The
query result R(q, s) satisfies the following:
R(q, s) ⊆ Os(q, s) ∪ Ov(q, vsb) ∪ Ov(q, vse) (3)
We give an example in Figure 3. A 3-nearest neighbor query is
issued by a user u located on segment v5v6. The exact answer
to this query is R(q, s) = {o5, o6, o7}, which is indeed a subset
of the union of Os(q, v5v6) = {o5, o6}, Ov(q, v5) = {o1, o6, o7}
and Ov(q, v6) = {o3, o4, o5}. We extend this model from a single
segment s to anonymized locations which potentially consist of
a set of segments S by employing the concept of border nodes
(see Definition 2). Concretely, the result of query q with S as its
anonymized location satisfies:
R(q, S) ⊆ (∪s∈SOs(q, s)) ∪
(∪v∈BV (S)Ov(q, v)) (4)
Finally, the evaluation cost of q with anonymized location S,
denoted by costeval(q, S) can be estimated as:
costeval(q, S) = Cs · |S|+ Cv · |BV (S)| (5)
where |BV | denotes the number of border nodes in S and |S|
denotes the number of segments in S.
Cost of Communication: We presented the architecture and
communication phases of STARCLOAK in Figure 1. We focus
specifically on the cost that is added by a location anonymization
service such as STARCLOAK. For query q, the communication
cost in mobile client’s exact request sent and the exact result it
receives do not change depending on whether an anonymization
engine is used or not, since a service request takes a fixed encoded
format and the size of the exact answer is fixed. With respect
to the messages exchanged between the location anonymization
engine and the LBS provider, we measure communication cost
as the length of the sent and received messages, and use ‖x‖ to
denote the encoded length of object x. For the message sent from
the location anonymization engine to the LBS provider, the query
remains intact while the location information is anonymized by
cloaking it to a set of segments S. Therefore, the communication
cost here is ‖q‖+ ‖S‖. The message sent from the LBS provider
to the location anonymization engine contains the candidate result
R(q, S); hence, the communication cost here is ‖R(q, S)‖. As
discussed above, a query q usually has fixed length. Also, for
given location privacy requirements, the number of segments in S
tends to be fairly stable. As such, we conclude that ‖R(q, S)‖ is
the dominant and most “optimizable” communication cost.
For query q, let res size denote the average exact result size
of q, e.g., if q is the popular k-NN query, then res size = k.
Following Equation 4, given a query q and anonymized location
S represented as a set of segments, the size of the candidate result
R(q, S) can be estimated as:
|R(q, S)| ≤ res size · |BV (S)|+
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈s
|Oe(q, e)| (6)
Then, denoting by ρo the average number of objects on an
edge and Co the cost of sending/receiving an object o over the
wireless channel (e.g., sending unique identifier of o), the total
communication cost for q with anonymized location S is:
costcomm(q, S) = Co ·
[
res size · |BV (S)|+ ρo ·
∑
s∈S
∑
e∈s
|e|
]
Overall Cost: It is desirable to combine costeval and
costcomm to find an estimation of the overall cost. In STAR-
CLOAK, we consider a linear combination scheme:
cost(q, S) = β · costcomm(q, S) + (1− β) · costeval(q, S)
where β is the parameter tuning the trade-off between evaluation
cost (mainly CPU computation on server side) and the communi-
cation cost (mainly bandwidth of wireless channel).
2.5 Problem Statement
Given a road network represented as a graph G with mobile users
traveling on the road network while issuing queries, where each
user u’s query q is associated with its profile (δqk, δ
q
l , σ
q
s , σ
q
t ), the
principles and objectives of STARCLOAK are:
• It transforms u’s true location to an anonymized (cloaked)
location S, where S is a subgraph of G.
• S satisfies the privacy requirements of q in terms of δqk-
user anonymity and δql -segment indistinguishability.
• S satisfies the utility constraints of q, i.e., spatial size of
S is no larger than σqs and the temporal delay caused by
location anonymization is no more than σqt .
• S achieves high attack-resilience; measured in terms of
low linkability and high segment entropy.
• Anonymized location S yields low cost(q, S).
3 STARCLOAK ALGORITHMS
This section explains the STARCLOAK constructs and algorithms
in detail. We first describe the concept of cloaking star, star graph,
and relevant data structures used in implementing STARCLOAK
efficiently in Section 3.1. We explain how an incoming query q is
pre-processed by STARCLOAK and added to the appropriate data
structures in Section 3.2. The overview of the main STARCLOAK
algorithm is presented in Section 3.3. The main algorithm relies
on several methods, such as selecting a star, updating the cloaking
graph (adding and removing queries from the cloaking graph),
candidate star-set selection, and star-set pruning. These methods
are described in Sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, respectively.
3.1 Star Concept and STARCLOAK Data Structures
Unlike conventional solutions which are indifferent to underlying
road network structure, use a random waypoint mobility model,
and rely on a rectangular or circular region as the basic unit of
location cloaking; STARCLOAK introduces a star as the basic unit
of location cloaking. Each star is defined by a vertex with its
adjacency segment list in G.
Definition 7 (Star). Let G = 〈VG, EG〉 denote the road network
of interest. We define a star Φi anchored at vertex vi ∈ VG as a
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Fig. 4: Illustration of the STAR concept
subgraph of G, denoted by Φi = 〈V iΦ, EiΦ〉, and V iΦ = {vi} and
EiΦ = {w|w 6= vi, w ∈ VG, (vi, w) ∈ EG}.
Accordingly, every node vi with dG(vi) ≥ 3 is associated
with a unique star Φi, which consists of vertex vi and all of its
adjacent road segments, that is, those segments with vi as one of
two end nodes. For example, in the left plot of Figure 4, star Φ5
is composed of node v5 and segments {v5v4, v5v6, v5v10}.
The road network can then be transformed into a star graph,
as shown on the right of Figure 4. Each vertex in the star graph is
a star in G, and two vertices are adjacent in the star graph if and
only if their corresponding stars in G share a segment. All edges
in the star graph are of unit length. The hop distance between two
stars Φi and Φj in a road network G is measured by the number
of hops in the shortest path between Φi and Φj . For example, in
Figure 4, the hop distance between Φ6 and Φ10 is 2, since their
shortest path in the star graph is Φ6 → Φ5 → Φ10.
In addition to the star concept, STARCLOAK uses some impor-
tant data structures for improved effectiveness and efficiency.
Query Queue,Q: A first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue that records
the incoming queries which must be anonymized before they
are relayed to the respective LBS provider. Incoming queries are
inserted into the queue from the tail. The anonymization engine
pops each query from Q to find a suitable cloaked subgraph S.
Expiration Heap, H : A max-min heap that maintains the
queries in the order of their expiration time computed according
to query arrival time and temporal delay constraint σqt . Anonymi-
zation engine checks H to identify queries that are close to their
expiration time in order to prioritize certain queries or to identify
queries that have been expired and should be removed from Q.
Cloaking Graph, GC : An undirected graph dynamically con-
structed in-memory, for recording the set of queries associated to
a star based on their similarities with respect to their privacy re-
quirements, their spatial proximity, and their expiration deadlines.
The cloaking graph will be explained further in Section 3.5.
Star-Map, MS and Query-Map, MQ: We create one hash
map to index stars called a Star-Map, and similarly, one hash map
to index queries associated to a node in the cloaking graph called
Query-Map, for fast star and query look-up.
Candidate Star-Set Queue, QC : A FIFO-based queue struc-
ture that records generated candidate cloaking star-sets. The prun-
ing unit in STARCLOAK pops star-sets from QC and applies an
effective and randomized pruning algorithm to generate the final
cloaked star regions.
3.2 Incoming Query Pre-processing
Let q denote an incoming location service query. STARCLOAK
pre-processes q to generate the internal representation of q by per-
forming the following sequence of tasks. First, a unique identifier
is assigned to q using a secure hash function with user ID and
query issue time, i.e., hash(q.u||q.t). Second, using the latitude
Algorithm 1: Main STARCLOAK Algorithm
Input: Q: query queue, H : expiration heap,
GC : cloaking graph
Output: QC : candidate star-set queue
1 while Q 6= ∅ do
2 Lu ← ∅
3 while true do
4 qe ← first entry of H
5 if qe is expired then
6 vu ← removeQueryFromCloakingGraph(qe)
7 if vu 6= ∅ then
8 Add vu to Lu
9 Pop qe from H
10 else
11 break
12 foreach vu ∈ Lu do
13 C ← SearchStarSet(vu)
14 if C 6= ∅ then
15 Add C to QC for pruning
16 qi ← first entry of Q
17 Φi ← SelectStar(qi)
18 vu ← addQuerytoCloakingGraph(qi, Φi)
19 C ← SearchStarSet(vu)
20 if C 6= ∅ then
21 Add C to QC for pruning
and longitude values of q’s focal location, the spatial index and
road network graph, the road segment of q is determined. Third,
q is inserted to queue Q. Fourth, q is inserted to the expiration
heap H with query expiration time as key and query identifier as
value. Query expiration time is the sum of query issue time and
user-specified temporal delay constraint: q.texp = q.t+ σ
q
t .
3.3 Main STARCLOAK Procedure
Before going into the details of each step, we summarize the main
STARCLOAK procedure in Algorithm 1. The location anonymi-
zation engine continuously pops queries from the query queue
Q and processes them to find anonymized location S fitting the
desired privacy and utility requirements. Prior to processing a
new query q, STARCLOAK removes expired queries from the
system. When an expired query denoted qe is removed from a
cloaking graph node, it is possible to find cloaked subgraph for
the remaining queries in the node. All updated nodes are stored in
the list Lu after expired queries are removed, and STARCLOAK
attempts to find anonymized locations for these nodes before
processing new queries (lines 12-15). Next, it pops a new query
from query queue Q and selects the star to assign to it (lines
16-17). Thereafter, STARCLOAK updates the cloaking graph with
the new query qi and searches a possible cloaked location for
the updated cloaking graph node (lines 18-21). Finally, in the
pruning phase, STARCLOAK randomly selects and removes non-
active stars from the candidate star-sets. In the next sections, we
present the details of these operations.
3.4 Select Star
STARCLOAK engine performs anonymization by scanning through
the FIFO query queue Q. All segments that are associated with
active queries are marked as active. The anonymization engine
first selects a star to assign queries on the active segment as the
initial cloaking star. Each segment has two end nodes and if both
6nodes are intersection nodes, i.e., dG(vs) ≥ 3 and dG(vt) ≥ 3,
STARCLOAK needs to determine to which star this active segment
should be assigned: Φs or Φt. For example, in Figure 4 when q1
arrives and segment v5v6 becomes active, one of the two possible
stars Φ5 or Φ6 will be determined as the initial cloaking star.
When a star Φ is “selected” and segment s is assigned to Φ, we
denote this by s← Φ.
In STARCLOAK, we use a cost-aware star selection strategy,
taking into account the cost model described in Section 2.4. Let q
be the query, AS denote the set of currently active segments on
the road network G, and φ be the set of selected stars. Then, the
minimization of the overall cost can be formally stated as:
min
φ
∑
Φ∈φ
cost(q,Φ) (7)
s.t. ∀s ∈ AS,∃Φ ∈ φ, s← Φ
This optimization problem aims at finding an assignment between
stars and segments such that the stars cover all segments with
active queries, while having the minimum total cost. It can be
shown that the optimization problem in Expression 7 is NP-Hard.
The proof follows from a reduction from the weighted Vertex-
Cover problem, which is a well-known NP-Complete problem.
Specifically, if for all stars Φ in the star graph we set cost(q,Φ) =
1, i.e., all stars have identical cost, then the problem is equivalent
to the classical Vertex-Cover problem. Motivated by the hardness
of finding a globally optimal solution to our optimization problem,
we propose a randomized algorithm called Select Star, which finds
approximate solutions with high assignment quality and attack-
resilience. The intuition is, for each query which has two endpoints
as viable stars, the algorithm probabilistically selects one of the
two stars with probability inversely proportional to their cost.
The technical description of our Select Star algorithm is given
in Algorithm 2. The algorithm works as follows. Let q be an
incoming query with travel segment s, and let Φa and Φb be
the two stars on the two endpoints of segment s. For simplicity,
we assume both endpoints are stars; if not, then s is trivially
assigned to the endpoint which is a star. If only one of Φa or Φb
is currently active, Select Star assigns s to the active star. If both
Φa and Φb are active, then s is assigned to Φa with probability
cost(q,Φb)/[cost(q,Φa) + cost(q,Φb)], or Φb otherwise. If
neither star is active, then the same probabilistic assignment to
either Φa or Φb is carried out, additionally, the assigned star
is marked as active for next iterations. This assignment has the
desirable property that the outcome of our randomized Select Star
algorithm is not far from an optimal assignment. More formally,
denoting by costopt the cost achieved by the optimal assignment,
and denoting by costrnd the cost achieved by our Select Star
algorithm, it holds in expectation that: E
[
costrnd
] ≤ 2 · costopt.
3.5 Cloaking Graph Update
We use the cloaking graph data structure (previously introduced
and denoted by GC ) to group nearby queries and efficiently index
other query groups that can be cloaked together for easy access.
The cloaking graph GC(VC , EC) is an undirected graph, where
VC is the set of vertices each representing a set of requests grouped
by the star they are assigned to and their profiles (similarities
in privacy and utility requirements). EC is the set of edges;
there is an edge e = (vi, vj) ∈ EC between vi and vj iff
queries associated with both vertices can be cloaked together based
Algorithm 2: Select Star Algorithm
Input: q: new query, IΦ: active star index
Output: Φ: selected star
1 s← the segment containing q
// Φa and Φb are two stars that share
segment s
2 if s is already assigned to Φa (resp. Φb) then
3 return Φa (resp. Φb)
4 else if {Φa,Φb} ∩ IΦ = {Φa,Φb} then
// both active, neither covers s
5 Assign s to Φa w.p.
cost(q,Φb)
cost(q,Φa)+cost(q,Φb)
or Φb
otherwise
6 else if {Φa,Φb} ∩ IΦ = Φa (resp. Φb) then
// only one star is active
7 Assign s to Φa (resp. Φb)
8 else if {Φa,Φb} ∩ IΦ = ∅ then
// neither star is selected yet
9 if dG(vsa) = 1 or dG(vsb) = 1 then
// only one end is a star
10 Add Φb (resp. Φa) to IΦ
11 Assign s to Φb (resp. Φa)
12 else
13 Assign s to Φa w.p.
cost(q,Φb)
cost(q,Φa)+cost(q,Φb)
or Φb
otherwise
14 Add Φa (or Φb) to IΦ
15 return Φa (or Φb) according to chosen assignment
on k-user anonymity, l-segment indistinguishability, and spatial
tolerance. Each vertex v in VC stores the following information.
The corresponding star v.Φ: for each active star, there is
at least one vertex in VC . The query set v.Q stores the queries
assigned to v.Φ. We compute the combined privacy of utility
requirements 〈δvk , δvl , σvs 〉 of the queries in v.Q as:
〈δvk , δvl , σvs 〉 := 〈max
q∈v.Q
δqk, maxq∈v.Q
δql , minq∈v.Q
σqs〉 (8)
We denote by covered star-set v.Θ the set that contains the identi-
fiers of stars which are within σvs distance from v.Φ. The segment
count v.sc denotes the number of segments associated with stars
in star-set v.Θ. Finally, adjacency list v.N is stored with v,
where being neighbors indicates that requests in corresponding
nodes can be cloaked together. Two cloaking nodes vi and vj are
considered to be neighbors iff: (i) stars associated with each node
are an element of the star-set of the other node, i.e., vi.Φ ∈ vj .Θ
and vj .Φ ∈ vi.Θ, and (ii) the number of segments that cover
both nodes is enough to satisfy their l-segment indistinguishability
requirements, i.e., |vi.Θ ∩ vj .Θ| ≥ max{δvil , δvjl }.
STARCLOAK performs two types of updates on the cloaking
graph: add query to cloaking graph, remove query from cloaking
graph. The function for adding queries to the cloaking graph is
given in Algorithm 3. When the function is called to insert a new
query, it checks all cloaking graph vertices associated with the
corresponding star to add the new query (lines 4-14). If there is no
possible vertex to add, a new vertex is created (lines 15-16). The
new query can be added to an existing vertex only if its privacy
profile does not conflict with the profile of the existing node. A
conflict occurs when new spatial tolerance is not able to satisfy the
new l-segment indistinguishability requirement. Thus, we need to
perform the checks under lines 4-14 to avoid any conflicts.
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Input: q: new query, Φn: assigned star
Output: vu: updated cloaking graph node
1 vu ← ∅
2 N ←MS .get(Φn)
3 if N 6= ∅ then
4 forall vi ∈ N do
5 if σqs < σvis then
6 sc← # of segments within σqs from Φn
7 if sc ≥ max{δql , δvil } then
8 Add q to the node vi
9 vu ← vi
10 break
11 else if vi.sc ≥ δql then
12 Add q to the node vi
13 vu ← vi
14 break
15 if vu = ∅ then
16 vu ← Create new node for query q
17 return vu
The function for removing queries from the cloaking graph is
given in Algorithm 4. Say that qe is the expired query that should
be removed. We first perform a look-up from MQ to find the
cloaking graph node vu associated with qe. If |vu.Q| > 1, i.e., vu
contains other queries as well, its information is updated based on
remaining queries after deletion of qe. The update is performed
according to Equation 8 to re-compute δvuk , δ
vu
l , and σ
vu
s . If
the updated vu now has either δ
vu
l < δ
qe
l or σ
vu
s > σ
qe
s , then
vu.Θ, vu.sc and vu.N are also re-computed. Note that the latter is
only necessary if segment indistinguishability or spatial tolerance
requirements are relaxed. On the other hand, if |vu.Q| = 1, i.e., qe
was the only query associated with vu, then vu is removed from
GC , and MS is updated. The return value of the function is vu,
which is an input for the next step (candidate star-set selection).
Algorithm 4: Remove Query from Cloaking Graph
Input: qe: expired query
Output: vu: updated cloaking graph node
1 vu ←MQ.get(qe)
2 if |vu.Q| > 1 then
3 Update δvuk , δ
vu
l , and σ
vu
s
4 if δvul < δ
qe
l or σ
vu
s > σ
qe
s then
5 Update vu.Θ, vu.sc and vu.N
6 else
7 Remove vu form GC
8 vu ← null
9 Update MS
10 Remove qe from MQ
11 return vu
3.6 Candidate Star-Set Selection
The goal of this step is to discover a set of stars, called candi-
date star-set, which constitutes a possible anonymized sub-graph
for certain queries. In order to find such star-set, STARCLOAK
searches over the cloaking graph and identifies a set of nodes,
denoted byNS, that satisfy the privacy requirements of all queries
associated with each node. Formally, let ϑ denote a candidate
Algorithm 5: Search Candidate Star-Set
Input: vu: updated vertex
Output: ϑ: candidate star-set
1 NS ← vu
2 if (ϑ← checkReqs(NS)) 6= ∅ then
3 return ϑ
4 QComb ← ∅
5 forall v ∈ vu.N do
6 NS ← vu ∪ v
7 if (ϑ← checkReqs(NS)) 6= ∅ then
8 return ϑ
9 QTemp ← QComb
10 forall C ∈ QComb do
11 if ∀vc ∈ C, vc ∈ v.N then
12 NS ← vu ∪ v ∪ C
13 if (ϑ← checkReqs(NS)) 6= ∅ then
14 return ϑ
15 else
16 QTemp ← QTemp ∪ C ∪ v
17 QComb ← QTemp
star-set, and let seg(ϑ) be a function that returns all segments
associated with input stars. NS meets k-user anonymity and l-
segment indistinguishability if and only if:
∀v ∈ NS :
[
δvk ≤
∑
vˆ∈NS
|vˆ.Q|
]
∧
[
δvl ≤ |seg(
⋂
vˆ∈NS
vˆ.Θ)|
]
(9)
Such NS forms candidate star-set ϑ with all stars shared within
the covered star-set of each node in NS:
ϑ =
⋂
v∈NS
v.Θ (10)
We assume the existence of a procedure named checkReqs(NS),
which takes as input a set of nodes NS, performs the privacy
check given in Equation 9, and returns either the ϑ built in
Equation 10 if NS passes the privacy check or an empty set ∅
otherwise. We use the checkReqs procedure in Algorithm 5 for
candidate star-set selection.
Algorithm 5 specifies the technical details of candidate star-set
selection process. Searching over the cloaking graph for finding
a candidate star-set starts with the updated vertex vu. If the
number of queries assigned to this vertex is fewer than the k-user
anonymity requirement of the vertex, then the algorithm continues
the search process over the neighboring nodes, ordered by the hop
distance between their associated star and the star of the starting
vertex. For each neighbor node, it applies checkReqs to vu and the
neighbor node combined (lines 6-8). If a candidate star-set still
cannot be found, neighbor node is evaluated with all possible node
combinations generated with the previously processed neighbor
nodes (lines 10-16). On line 10, we denote by C a clique in
QComb, and line 11 checks if the clique satisfies the l-segment
indistinguishability requirement. The possible node combinations
are tracked by variable QComb, which is enlarged in each iteration
so that newly visited nodes are added (lines 16-17). The output of
the algorithm is ϑ, a candidate a star-set.
3.7 Star-Set Pruning
Final component of STARCLOAK is star-set pruning: pruning of
extra segments from candidate star-set. As specified in the main
STARCLOAK procedure in Algorithm 1, the candidate star-sets
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Input: Qc: candidate star-set queue
1 while true do
2 if Qc 6= ∅ then
3 ϑ← Pop the first entry of Qc
4 BS ← Find boundary stars of ϑ
5 FS ← Select active stars
6 lmax ← Find max segment requirement
7 while true do
8 Φr ← Randomly select star from BS
9 if Φr /∈ FS then
10 ϑ← ϑ \ Φr
11 if # of segments in ϑ > lmax then
12 Update BS
13 else
14 ϑ← ϑ ∪ Φr
15 Output ϑ
16 break
found by Algorithm 5 are added to the candidate star-set queue
denotedQC , and then they are pruned by the star-set pruning com-
ponent. Star-set pruning plays an important role in the generation
of low cost cloaked subgraphs and improved attack-resilience by
randomizing the star selection from outer to center of the candidate
star-set. Note that star-set pruning is highly parallelizable, i.e., it
is possible to implement one or more pruning processes running
in parallel (each popping from QC ) while another process in the
anonymization engine performs remaining tasks and adds to QC .
The function for pruning star-sets is given in Algorithm 6.
Pruning starts by popping a candidate star-set from queue QC .
Let ϑ denote the popped star-set. We find the set of boundary stars
BS of ϑ, which are the stars that have at least one neighbor star
not in ϑ, as well as the set of active stars AS of ϑ which cannot
be removed from the star-set. Let lmax denote the maximum l-
segment indistinguishability requirement in the star-set. We run
multiple iterations, and within each iteration, the following are
performed. First, a random star denoted Φr is selected from
BS \ FS. If ϑ still satisfies lmax-segment indistinguishability
after removing Φr from ϑ; then Φr is removed from ϑ, BS
is updated by removing Φr from BS, and we proceed to the
next iteration. However, if lmax-segment indistinguishability is
violated after removing Φr from ϑ, then the pruning stops here
and the current ϑ (without removing Φr) is produced as the final
output of the pruning process.
We give an example of star-set pruning in Figure 5. The
candidate star-set is shown on the left with the black and grey
circles. Black circles depict active nodes that cannot be removed
because of their association with active queries. Suppose that
the maximum segment requirement is 9. First, one generates
boundary star list {Φ5,Φ7,Φ9,Φ13}, i.e., gray circles that are
connected with the white circles. Then, one of the boundary
stars is selected randomly, say Φ5 for sake of example. After
removing Φ5, remaining stars still meet the segment requirement.
Boundary star set is updated with the new star Φ10 and another
star is selected randomly from the set. Suppose Φ7 is selected for
pruning; indistinguishability requirement is still satisfied with the
remaining stars. Note that there are no new boundary stars because
Φ12 is an active star. One selects another star from the current
boundary star set which is {Φ5,Φ9,Φ10,Φ13}. Assume Φ9 is
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Fig. 5: Star-set pruning example
selected for removal; then boundary star set is updated with new
star Φ15. However, removing any of the current stars now violates
the queries’ segment indistinguishability requirement, thus we
have to add back the selected star to the star list. Associated
segments constitute the cloaked subgraph. We show the resulting
cloaked subgraph with bold lines on the right side of Figure 5.
4 VARIANTS AND OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we introduce two variants of STARCLOAK for
finding cloaking regions with lower cost, query processing time,
and network bandwidth usage without sacrificing privacy.
4.1 Spatially Bounded STARCLOAK
Basic STARCLOAK generates cloak regions whenever it finds a
star-set that satisfies all queries’ privacy requirements. However,
this approach may cause cloak regions that consist of stars that
are far from each other and scattered across the part of the
road network within σs. An example scenario is given in sup-
plementary material. We propose spatially bounded STARCLOAK
to generate more compact cloaked subgraphs. The essence of this
optimization is to sacrifice anonymization time in favor of lower
query processing and communication costs. We define a system
parameter λ ≥ 1 called the compactness factor, that controls the
maximum hop distance between selected vertices in the candidate
star-set. To generate more compact cloaked subgraphs, we make
some modifications to the candidate star-set selection algorithm.
First, we group neighbors by their distance d to the starting
node. bd/λc determines the level of each group element. At each
level, the algorithm only considers neighbor nodes which can be
cloaked with the node combinations generated in the previous
level. The algorithm searches level by level iteratively in top-down
manner. Spatially bounded STARCLOAK enforces compactness by
selecting active stars that, for each star in the star-set there is at
least one other star which is no further than 2λ− 1 hop distance.
Illustrative Example: Figure 6 shows an example scenario
with queries q1, q2, . . . , q9 distributed on the road-network as
in Figure 6a. Suppose that queries are issued in the order of
their ID, and all queries have 3-user anonymity requirement.
(For simplicity, we assume the spatial tolerance is high enough
to cover all stars in our small road network, and no l-segment
indistinguishability requirement exists.) In Figure 6b we give an
example star assignment for the 9 queries. When we apply basic
STARCLOAK for the given queries, selected stars will be as shown
in Figures 6c, 6d and 6e. It can be observed that selected stars are
spread all over the network. On the other hand, Figure 7a, 7b and
7c show a more compact star selection possibility for the same
queries with different combinations.
Suppose that for the above example, we used spatially bounded
STARCLOAK with compactness factor λ = 1. During the process-
ing of q3, it would first check neighbor nodes which are 2 hop
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Fig. 6: A spatially suboptimal cloaking output that can potentially be produced by basic STARCLOAK
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Fig. 7: Improvement of spatially bounded STARCLOAK for the
same queries from Figure 6a and 6b
distance from the star Φ6. Since there is no neighbor in level
1, the anonymization engine would then accept new queries to
process. While it is processing q7, it first adds neighbor node
associated with the star Φ12 which is in the 1 hop distance level.
Two nodes do not satisfy k-user anonymity requirement yet, thus
the anonymization engine continues to process neighbor nodes at
the second level (Φ9 and Φ13). Since we use a FIFO-based query
processing ordering to decrease waiting time, Φ13 is selected in
the next iteration. Three nodes together meet all users’ privacy
requirement and can be removed from the cloaking graph.
4.2 Hybrid STARCLOAK
The main difficulty in spatially bounded STARCLOAK is the
choice of λ. At first sight, λ can be determined by the query
density of a general area. However, query density is often highly
dynamic and changes street-by-street or star-by-star. Even neigh-
boring segments may have different densities. Thus, the λ deter-
mined based on query density of a general area may be undesirable
for sparse sub-areas, and it is not possible to define an optimal
compactness factor for each individual star at each time. To
overcome this problem, we propose hybrid STARCLOAK, which
leverages advantages from both basic STARCLOAK and spatially
bounded STARCLOAK. In hybrid STARCLOAK, we first try to
generate cloaking regions with spatially bounded STARCLOAK,
and then for queries which could not be cloaked yet and are close
to their expiration time, we apply basic STARCLOAK. We use a
consideration factor denoted by α as the system parameter to
decide when to apply basic STARCLOAK. Hybrid STARCLOAK
periodically checks the expiration heap H to see if any query is
closer than α to their expiration time.
To demonstrate the usefulness of hybrid STARCLOAK, we
consider the example from Figure 6. When we use spatially
bounded STARCLOAK with compactness factor λ = 1 for the
example in Figure 6, queries q3, q4, q9 would remain in the system
until new queries were issued in their neighborhood, since the
distance between stars Φ6 and Φ8 is two hops. Assume now
that these queries have an expiration time, then they may have
to be dropped before the new queries arrive, even though there
is a possible cloaked subgraph. With hybrid STARCLOAK, we
would be able to apply basic STARCLOAK towards the queries’
expiration time, and we would be able to cloak those stars together,
thereby saving the queries from being dropped.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
5.1 Experimental Setup
We used two different road network datasets, California 1 and
Georgia 2, with varying sizes to observe the effect of map density
on the efficiency and effectiveness of STARCLOAK. California
road network contains only highways with 21,693 edges and
21,048 nodes. 87,635 points of interest from 62 different classes
(e.g., hospital, school, etc.) are associated with the road network.
Georgia is the larger road network dataset, which contains primary
and secondary roads with 430,849 edges and 428,708 nodes. To
simulate user movements, we used the Brinkhoff data generator
for moving objects 3. We assign the same number of moving
objects (10,000) to each map, with the intention of simulating high
user density and low user density conditions since the two maps
have different scale. In each simulation, we define two classes of
moving objects: vehicles with fast speed (such as passenger cars)
and vehicles with slow speed (such as trucks).
During the simulation, each vehicle generates k-NN queries
with randomized probability with parameters specified as: (1) k
denotes the number of nearest points of interest requested; (2)
δk and δl are the personalized privacy parameters; (3) σs and σt
are the personalized spatial and temporal tolerance constraints;
(4) γ is the waiting time, i.e., amount of time a vehicle waits
until its previous query is either answered or dropped, before
issuing another query. The values of each individual query are
drawn independently from Gaussian distributions with default
mean and standard deviation parameters listed in Table 1. The
values of parameters σt, α, and γ are in seconds. The compactness
factor λ and consideration factor α are only used in spatially
bounded STARCLOAK and hybrid STARCLOAK. All algorithms
are implemented in Java and tested on a Windows 7 platform with
Intel(R) Core(TM) CPU (4.00 GHz) and 16GB memory.
5.2 Compared Approaches
In our evaluation, we compare multiple approaches. Random
sampling and network expansion serve as two baseline anony-
1. http://www.cs.utah.edu/∼lifeifei/SpatialDataset.htm
2. https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-geodatabases.html
3. http://iapg.jade-hs.de/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
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TABLE 1: Default parameter settings used in our experiments
Parameter k δk δl σs σt γ λ α
Mean 5 5 5 4 10 20 1 2
Deviation 1 1.5 1.5 1 2 2 0 0
mization approaches. XSTAR [7] is the most relevant system to
STARCLOAK. We also include three versions of STARCLOAK in
our comparison: basic, spatially bounded, and hybrid.
Random Sampling: Given an incoming query with profile
(δqk, δ
q
l , σ
q
s , σ
q
t ), this approach iteratively samples segments ran-
domly from the spatial region within σqs one-by-one, and adds
them to the anonymized location. It terminates when (δqk, δ
q
l ) pri-
vacy requirements are satisfied. The strength of random sampling
is its high resilience to inference attacks. Its weakness is the high
query processing cost due to random segment selection.
Network Expansion: For incoming query q, this approach
starts from the actual segment of the query and incrementally adds
a neighboring segment using Dijkstra’s deterministic network ex-
pansion algorithm. The order of expansion is based on the distance
between q’s focal position and neighboring segments’ midpoints.
The approach terminates when (δqk, δ
q
l ) privacy requirements are
satisfied. Network expansion results in a cloaked location con-
nected as a densely compact subgraph. Its advantage is low query
processing cost. Its main weakness is added vulnerability to attack
since the expansion follows a deterministic best-first search.
XSTAR: The most related work to STARCLOAK in the lit-
erature is XSTAR [7], which performs road network anonymi-
zation under utility and privacy constraints. Our evaluation shows
STARCLOAK is superior to XSTAR in aspects including reduced
query processing and anonymization time, higher success rate, and
higher attack-resilience.
STARCLOAK and Variants: In our result graphs, we denote
by STARCLOAK the basic version of STARCLOAK. We include its
two optimized variants, which are spatially bounded STARCLOAK
and hybrid STARCLOAK, in our experimental comparison.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the performance of different mechanisms, we use
multiple metrics: success rate in anonymization, anonymization
time, query processing time, size of candidate result set, successful
throughput, and segment entropy against inference attacks.
Success Rate: An effective anonymization engine should
successfully anonymize as many queries as possible, and drop
as few queries as possible. Success rate measures the fraction of
successfully anonymized queries divided by the number of total
queries issued by the mobile users.
Anonymization Time: When users issue queries, they want
fast answers (low temporal delay). However, an anonymization
engine needs a certain amount of time to perform the anonymi-
zation. The anonymization time metric measures the average time
elapsed from the query issue time until successful anonymization.
From the user’s perspective, it is desired that the anonymization
time is as low as possible. Note that in order to ensure a fair
comparison among multiple compared approaches, we measure
anonymization time only on successfully anonymized queries.
Query Processing Time: This metric measures the processing
time cost for anonymized queries. With anonymization, queries
are evaluted on cloaked subgraphs instead of user’s exact location.
Number of border nodes and edges in the cloaked subgraph impact
query processing time.
Candidate Result Size: This metric aims to measure the
added bandwidth overhead for the communication between the
anonymization engine and the LBS provider. More compact
anonymized subgraphs lead to smaller candidate result sets, thus
lower communication cost.
Successful Throughput: We use the throughput metric to
evaluate the scalability of the anonymization approaches. Rate of
successful throughput equals the multiplication of query execution
rate (number of queries processed per second) and success rate.
Entropy: We use entropy as a quantitative measure of ad-
versarial uncertainty achieved by anonymization, where higher
entropy means higher attack-resilience. Given an anonymized lo-
cation S for user u as a subgraph consisting of multiple segments,
the segment entropy of S can be calculated by:
H(S) = −
∑
s∈S
link[u← s] · log2(link[u← s])
Note that the number of segments in the generated anonymized
locations may vary from anonymization algorithm to algorithm,
based on their segment selection strategy. Thus, using simple
entropy for different sized anonymized locations may not ade-
quately capture the strength of protection. For this reason, we use
normalized entropy [10] defined as: H(S)/ log2(|S|).
5.4 Experiment Results
Results on Success Rate: Figure 8 shows the percentage success
rates of compared approaches with respect to varying δk, δl, σs,
and σt for California and Georgia maps. Generally, STARCLOAK
and its optimized variants have high success rates because of their
ability in handling different user requirements effectively. The re-
sults show that increasing the privacy requirements often decreases
success rate, but the effects are different for different maps and
different privacy requirements. For example, when δk increases,
success rate decreases faster on the Georgia map compared to
California. The reason for this is the query density of the maps.
Keeping the number of queries constant across maps, since the
Georgia map is more detailed than California, the distribution of
query density on Georgia is sparser. Thus, on Georgia, the chance
of finding enough queries to cloak together under the same spatial
constraint is smaller, causing more queries being dropped and
lowered success rate. On the other hand, for XSTAR, increasing
δl impacts success rate on California more than Georgia, unlike
STARCLOAK. The reason for this is also related to query density.
XSTAR anonymizes queries on the same star together, whereas in
STARCLOAK if there is a conflict between two queries’ l-segment
indistinguishability and σs spatial tolerance, they are cloaked on
different vertices of the cloaking graph. This allows STARCLOAK
to maintain high success rates despite increasing δl.
Comparing the three STARCLOAK variants, the basic version
achieves highest success rate, followed by hybrid STARCLOAK
and then spatially bounded STARCLOAK. This is expected because
spatially bounded STARCLOAK aims at finding compact cloak
regions, whereas basic STARCLOAK allows suboptimal regions
for higher success rate. Hybrid STARCLOAK achieves a trade-off
between success rate and compactness of a cloak region. The right-
most two graphs within Figure 8 display the impact of changing
spatial and temporal tolerance constraints on success rate. When
users have higher tolerance, their queries are anonymized with
higher success rate. We see clearly that lower spatial tolerance
affects XSTAR’s success rate negatively far more than it affects
STARCLOAK, once again showing STARCLOAK’s superiority.
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Fig. 8: Success rate for California map (four graphs in top row) and Georgia map (four graphs in bottom row)
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Fig. 9: Successful throughput for California map (four graphs in top row) and Georgia map (four graphs in bottom row)
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Fig. 10: Anonymization time for California map (four graphs in top row) and Georgia map (four graphs in bottom row)
Results on Successful Throughput: The throughputs of
compared approaches with respect to varying δk, δl, σs and σt
are shown in Figure 9 for California and Georgia maps. Note that
the y-axes of these figures are in logarithmic scale. We observe
that throughputs of the baseline approaches (random sampling
and network expansion) are often significantly lower than XSTAR
and STARCLOAK. While XSTAR and STARCLOAK maintain high
throughput despite increasing δk (stricter privacy), the throughput
of XSTAR drops when δl is increased. Hence, we find that STAR-
CLOAK is much more capable of satisfying challenging l-segment
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Fig. 11: Query processing time for California map
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Fig. 12: Candidate result size for California map
indistinguishability requirements than compared approaches.
With respect to varying spatial and temporal tolerances, we
observe that STARCLOAK variants are capable in handling a
variety of tolerance values without significant degradation in
throughput. In contrast, the throughputs of the baseline approaches
are often 5-6 times smaller than STARCLOAK. Furthermore, while
XSTAR’s throughput is comparable to STARCLOAK when σs is
high, XSTAR may perform even worse than the baselines for small
σs (see Figure 9). Collectively, these results show the superiority
of STARCLOAK and its variants in query service and scalability
compared to both XSTAR and baseline approaches, under varying
privacy and utility settings.
Results on Anonymization Time: In Figure 10, we report the
average anonymization times for the California and Georgia maps.
The results show that STARCLOAK variants have significantly
better anonymization time than compared approaches under vari-
ous privacy and utility constraints. XSTAR often has the highest
anonymization time on California map. Among STARCLOAK
variants, hybrid STARCLOAK and spatially bounded STARCLOAK
are similar, whereas basic STARCLOAK has lowest anonymization
time. This is because basic STARCLOAK has no preference
towards “waiting for a better opportunity” to generate cloaked
regions for incoming queries, whereas the other two variants can
wait closer until the query expiration time before anonymization.
Results on Query Processing Time: We measure the average
query processing time of an anonymized query on the server-side
and report the results in Figure 11. Since each compared anony-
mization approach may have different success rate, in order to
ensure a fair comparison, we pick the same number of anonymized
locations across all approaches in this set of experiments and
those experiments reported in the next subsection (which is the
number of anonymized locations achieved by the approach with
lowest success rate). It is expected that anonymized locations with
scattered segments will cause higher query processing time. We
observe that STARCLOAK’s results are often significantly better
than its main competitor XSTAR. Among the three STARCLOAK
variants, basic STARCLOAK has highest query processing time,
whereas the hybrid and spatially bounded versions have similar
processing time, because of their more compact cloaked regions.
The improvement of spatially bounded STARCLOAK becomes
significant particularly when σs is relaxed (increased).
Results on Candidate Result Size: The size of the candidate
result is an important measure of the added network bandwidth
cost caused by anonymization. Larger the number of items re-
turned in the candidate result set, higher the communication band-
width cost. We measure the candidate result set size under varying
δk, δl, σs, and k parameters, and report the results in Figure 12.
Spatially bounded and hybrid STARCLOAK often provide the best
results due to their compact output cloak regions. STARCLOAK’s
competitors are comparable when the δk, δl privacy requirements
are relaxed, but as we make the privacy requirements stricter,
the bandwidth cost of XSTAR in particular becomes significantly
large. The increase in candidate result size caused by large σs can
be explained by the fact that relaxed spatial tolerance inevitably
causes the STARCLOAK approaches to be more relaxed regarding
the compactness of the output cloak regions, thus query candidate
result sets are also more scattered and diverse. The increase in
candidate result size due to increased k is expected, since k is the
parameter controlling the number of nearest neighbors returned by
the k-NN query. Naturally, with higher k, more candidates have
to be returned, hence the candidate result set has larger size.
Results on Attack-Resilience: We use the normalized entropy
metric to measure attack-resilience of compared approaches, with
higher entropy meaning higher attack-resilience. The results are
shown in Figure 13. In this set of experiments, it is expected that
by nature, random sampling will give highest entropy, whereas
network expansion will give lowest entropy. The results in Figure
13 confirm these expectations, and show that the entropy of
STARCLOAK variants and XSTAR are between random sampling
and network expansion. Under a variety of settings, STARCLOAK
has higher entropy than XSTAR. Furthermore, STARCLOAK’s
entropy values are similar to random sampling, showing that it
achieves near-optimal attack-resilience. As δk increases, since
more users are cloaked together, entropy increases. The increase
in entropy is more clear for spatially bounded STARCLOAK and
hybrid STARCLOAK compared to basic STARCLOAK, as their
output cloak regions are more compact (focused on the users’
actual locations) with small δk in the first place. In the rightmost
two graphs in Figure 13, we show the impact of the number of
injected queries on entropy in the query injection attack. In XSTAR
13
2 3 4 5 6
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 S t a r C l o a k B o u n d e d  S t a r C l o a k H y b r i d  S t a r C l o a k
m e a n  o f  δk
 
 
ent
rop
y  R a n d o m N e t w o r k X S t a r
3 6 9 1 2 1 5
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
m e a n  o f  δl
1 2 3 4 50 . 2 5
0 . 3 0
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
m e a n  o f  σs
0 1 2 3 4 50 . 1 5
0 . 2 0
0 . 2 5
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
#  o f  i n j e c t e d  q u e r y
2 3 4 5 6
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 S t a r C l o a k B o u n d e d  S t a r C l o a k H y b r i d  S t a r C l o a k
 R a n d o m N e t w o r k X S t a r
 
 
ent
rop
y
m e a n  o f  δk
3 6 9 1 2 1 5
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 4
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
m e a n  o f  δl
1 2 3 4 5
0 . 3
0 . 4
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
m e a n  o f  σs
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 8
0 . 9
1 . 0
 
 
ent
rop
y
#  o f  i n j e c t e d  q u e r y
Fig. 13: Average entropy for California map (four graphs in top row) and Georgia map (four graphs in bottom row)
and STARCLOAK, while it is generally the case that with more
query injections cause a more successful attack, the vulnerability
of XSTAR becomes significantly higher than STARCLOAK when
4 or more queries are injected. Unlike XSTAR and STARCLOAK,
random sampling and network expansion do not consider nearby
queries’ locations during cloak region generation, thus their en-
tropy remains unaffected by query injections.
6 RELATED WORK
Location privacy has been an active research area for more than
a decade. Several location and trajectory obfuscation mecha-
nisms have been developed to satisfy privacy notions such as k-
anonymity, differential privacy, and geo-indistinguishability [9],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. However, these mechanisms
operate in the Euclidean space, and do not take the road network
structure under consideration. In this paper, we study location
privacy protection for mobile travelers on road networks.
Location privacy approaches on road networks can be studied
under three categories: mobile permission systems, mix-zones, and
location obfuscation. Two recent works under the permission sys-
tems category are SmarPer [17] and PrivacyZone [18]. Permission
systems are not comparable to STARCLOAK because they either
completely block location access or randomly perturb the user’s
location when the user is in a designated sensitive zone. Mix-zones
were proposed to circumvent the risks of continuous location
tracking on road networks. After a set of users enter a mix-
zone, they change pseudonyms and exit the mix-zone such that
the mapping between users’ old and new pseudonyms is hidden.
Among recent works under this category, MobiMix considers road
network, time spent in mix-zone, and travel speed constraints
to build attack-resilient mix-zones [19], [20]. Palanisamy and
Liu [21] further improve effectiveness and attack-resilience by
studying continuous query correlation attacks and non-rectangular
mix-zones. The approach in [22] enables distribution of group
secret keys in cryptographic mix-zones in the presence of mali-
cious eavesdroppers, without relying on trusted dealers. Vaas et
al. [23] propose using fictive chaff vehicles to establish attack-
resilient mix-zones in areas with low traffic density. Mix-zones
differ from location obfuscation and STARCLOAK in several ways.
Most importantly, mix-zones do not anonymize users on demand
(i.e., when user issues query to a LBS) but rather when sufficiently
many users enter a mix-zone.
STARCLOAK falls under the location obfuscation category.
Under this category, Mouratidis and Yiu [24] provide k-anonymity
for road network travelers under the reciprocity requirement.
Chow et al. [25] support personalized privacy specifications such
that a cloaked region satisfies k-anonymity and includes a total
minimum segment length of L. Li and Palanisamy [26] propose
reversible cloaking schemes such that anonymity levels can be
reduced to accommodate multi-level privacy and selective de-
anonymization. Yang et al. [27] study the orthogonal problem of
path privacy, and define the M-cut requirement to achieve path
privacy. A similar path privacy problem is studied in [28]. Another
orthogonal problem is semantic-aware and privacy-preserving
sharing of sensitive locations under road network constraints
[29], [30]. In contrast, STARCLOAK does not require semantic
annotation. Most closely related to our work under this category
is XSTAR [7]. We empirically compare against XSTAR and show
that STARCLOAK is superior to XSTAR in several aspects.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed and evaluated STARCLOAK, a utility-
aware and privacy-preserving location query system for mobile
users traveling on road networks. STARCLOAK has an array
of desirable features, including utility-aware and personalized
location privacy protection, cost-aware star selection, and ran-
domized star-set pruning for improved attack-resilience. The two
optimized variants of STARCLOAK, namely spatially bounded
STARCLOAK and hybrid STARCLOAK, improve network band-
width usage and query processing time, with small sacrifice in
success rate, throughput, and anonymization time. In comparison
to XSTAR, STARCLOAK achieves reduced query processing and
anonymization time, higher success rate in anonymization, and
higher entropy against the considered attacks.
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